Question 3
QUESTION III.
Whether trinity and supreme simplicity stand together.
Consequently it is asked whether trinity and supreme simplicity stand together; and concerning this two things are asked.
The first is whether the divine being is most simple. Second, whether trinity and supreme simplicity stand together.
ARTICLE I.
Whether the divine being is most simple.
Concerning the first it is proceeded thus and shown that the divine being is most simple.
1. Augustine, Confessions, Book II: "Nothing simpler than you is found": therefore he is simple in the ultimate degree, therefore also in the highest, therefore he is most simple.
2. Likewise, Confessions, Book XIII: "You alone are simple, for whom living is not one thing and living well another": therefore in God being and well-being are the same: but in that in which these are the same, there is no composition, but supreme simplicity: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, everything absolutely first is most simple: but the divine being is of this kind: therefore etc. The major is proved: because the composite is posterior to its components, and the simple is prior to the composite: therefore the cause of the predicate is in the subject in the aforesaid proposition: therefore it is true per se. The minor is manifest, because God is a being from himself, for if he had being from elsewhere, then that would be his God, not he himself. And again, if there is a stopping point and one does not proceed to infinity, it is necessary to posit that some being is the first of all.
4. Likewise, everything absolutely necessary is most simple; but the divine being is absolutely necessary: therefore etc. Avicenna and Algazel prove the major in their Metaphysics; for the absolutely necessary is entirely independent and incorruptible: but every composite depends on its components and into them, as far as its nature is concerned, is resolvable. The minor is manifest, because the nobler part of a contrariety is to be attributed to God: therefore since the absolutely necessary is nobler than the possible or contingent: it seems etc.
5. Likewise, everything most noble is most simple: but the divine being is of this kind: therefore etc. The minor is manifest; the major is proved, because to the most noble the conditions of nobility are to be attributed in the highest degree, otherwise it would not be the most noble: but simplicity is a condition pertaining to nobility, as is evident: therefore it is necessary that it be posited to exist in God entirely in the highest degree.
6. Likewise, everything most powerful is most simple: the divine being is most powerful: therefore etc. The minor is manifest, because he is therefore called God, because he is omnipotent. The major is proved, because "a united power is more infinite," according to what is said in the Book of Causes: therefore the most infinite power is the most united, therefore the most simple: but there is no most simple power unless the substance also be such: therefore etc.
7. Likewise, everything that is whatever it has is most simple; but God is whatever He has; therefore etc. The major is evident, because if there were any composition, neither of those would be the other. The minor is evident through induction and reason: because God has wisdom, therefore either He is wisdom, or He is not, and so with the others, except the relative properties. If He is wisdom, I have my proposition; if not, and He is wise by wisdom, then He is wise by something other than what He Himself is; therefore if He has wisdom from another, He also has perfection from another; therefore He is not God, etc.
8. Likewise, everything most perfect is most simple; but the divine being is of this kind; therefore etc. The minor is manifest, because no condition is more consonant with the divine being than perfection. The major is proved: because that which in its entirety and according to its whole self is perfection is more perfect than that which has in itself something perfectible; but everything composite or composable has in itself something perfectible; therefore it is impossible that something be supremely perfect unless it is also most simple; therefore the same as before.
9. Likewise, everything composite is mutable; therefore, by destruction of the consequent, everything immutable is simple, and what is absolutely immutable is simple in every way; but the divine being is entirely immutable, because it can be changed neither to something better, nor to something equal, nor to something worse, since it is entirely the supreme good; therefore the divine being is most simple.
10. Likewise, the more simple something is, the more it is one; but the divine being is supremely one, as was shown in the preceding; therefore it is necessary that the divine being is absolutely most simple.
To the contrary: 1. Anselm: Whatever belongs to God belongs to Him in the highest degree; but the divine being differs from created being; therefore it differs supremely. But the more differences by which something differs, the more it differs and the more composite it is; therefore it is necessary that the divine being is supremely composite.
2. Likewise, a being entirely abstracted from a supposit is simpler than one that is concrete; but the divine being is not abstracted but concrete with a supposit, because in the divine being there is true deity and a true hypostasis having deity; therefore etc.
If you say that they differ by reason alone: either something real corresponds to that distinction of reason, or nothing; if something, I have my proposition; if nothing, then the whole thing is vain and false.
3. Likewise, what pertains to nobility in a creature is to be attributed also to the Creator; but the more composite a creature is, the more it approaches the condition of nobility, as is evident in man, who is the most perfect of creatures that are in the universe, and who is also the image of God; therefore it seems etc.
4. Again, in ordered forms, the form that is constituted by addition is more actual, as is evident in the form of the genus and the species, since the form of the species is more actual: but what is constituted by addition is composite: therefore composition attests to greater actuality and completeness. Since therefore the divine esse is most actual and most complete: therefore it is most composite.
5. Again, the properties of the divine esse are unity and truth and goodness: therefore either truth is the same as substance, or not. If entirely the same: then truth is no more a property of substance than conversely, which is absurd: if not entirely the same: then it adds something: therefore there is some composition.
6. Again, either truth and goodness are the same, or not. If the same: then a vestige of goodness is a vestige of truth, which is false: but if in some way they differ: then that in which they exist is in some way composite.
If you say that they differ in concept; the question is then asked, what underlies that concept.
7. Again, acts are diversified through their objects: but the soul turns toward God under the concept of the true through cognition, and under the concept of the good through love: if therefore these are formal objects, and these acts are formally different: it seems etc.
8. Again, in the divine esse there is power, wisdom, and will: therefore either I say something more through these three than through one of them, or not. If not: then one who says that God has only power detracts nothing from God, which is false: if something more, and all of that is in God: therefore there is also composition.
9. Again, either power is knowledge, or not. If not: then in the divine esse there are diverse things: if so: then to know is to be able. But God knows evil things: therefore He can do evil things: but this is absurd: it remains therefore that they are distinct: therefore it seems that it is composite.
10. Again, the divine will restricts power; for God does not do all things that He knows and can do, but only those that He wills: but nothing restricts itself: therefore power and wisdom and will are one thing and another: therefore the divine nature is composite.
11. Again, nothing altogether simple is participated according to more and less; but the divine esse is participated according to more and less both by wayfarers and by the Blessed, who participate in and see it in itself: therefore it is impossible that it be altogether simple.
12. Again, nothing altogether simple has a multiform operation, because "the same thing, remaining the same, is always disposed to do the same thing"; and further, a multiform action either is the agent itself, and thus it is not simple: or not, and thus it is still not simple: but God has a multiform operation, namely to create and to govern and to reward: therefore etc.
If you say that they differ by reason of effects; to the contrary: action does not come from the effect, but rather the reverse: therefore that power is diversified rather according to the diversity of actions than according to the variety of effects.
13. Furthermore, nothing entirely simple simultaneously exercises operations that are entirely disparate and infinite, because what is simple, toward whatever it turns itself, turns itself totally, and for an infinite action no power less than infinite suffices: but God simultaneously creates the soul of one and justifies the soul of another, which are disparate and infinite actions: therefore etc.
14. Furthermore, nothing entirely simple is multiform in species or in likeness; but in the divine being there is a plurality of ideal reasons, because "man was made by one reason, and horse by another": therefore the divine being is not most simple.
If you say that the plurality of ideas is a plurality of relations: to the contrary: the likeness of things is considered not according to relation, but according to form: if therefore ideas are called likenesses in the divine mind, and nothing that is the same and according to the same has likeness to diverse things: it is necessary therefore that there be composition in the divine art and wisdom.
CONCLUSION.
The divine being is most simple.
I respond: It must be said that the divine being is most simple. — For the evidence of this matter, two things must be considered, namely the perfection of the divine conditions and the modes of our considerations.
If we consider the modes of the divine conditions, the divine being, by the very fact that it is first, is most simple. For by the very fact that it is first, all things flow from it, and by the very fact that they flow from it, they return and are led back to it as to the ultimate end, and from this it has that it is the Alpha and the Omega, the First and the Last, the Beginning and the End. Because therefore these things, which seem most distant, come together into what is in every way one, it is necessary that the divine being itself be most perfect, as a kind of intelligible circle: it is also necessary that it be most simple.
For something falls short of supreme simplicity in three ways: either because it is composed from others, or because it is composed with another, or because it is composable in aptitude. But the divine being, from the fact that it is first, is not composed from others, for it has nothing prior before itself; from the fact that it is most perfect, it is not composed with another, for what is perfect does not come to the constitution of a third: from the fact, moreover, that it is ultimate, all other things are ordered to it as to a quieting terminus: and thus it is most absolute, and through this it not only lacks actual composition, but also possible composition, and thus to be most simple belongs to God truly and properly, for these three cannot be found together in anything else.
It also belongs [to God] perfectly from this threefold condition. For because it is most perfect, it has all the conditions of nobility; but because it is the ultimate and the best, on account of which all things exist, it has all those conditions in the highest degree; because it is the first, in which there is no diversity, it is necessary that all be one in it, and thus most simple through the exclusion of all composition and the inclusion of all perfection. Therefore all the conditions of nobility are in God, namely power and wisdom and will, goodness, truth and unity, being, living and understanding, and other similar things, truly, perfectly, and supremely under their proper and perfect nature; yet they are one to such a degree that they introduce no composition nor diminish from simplicity. - Which no one clearly sees unless he similarly understands concerning the divine being the highest simplicity together with the highest immensity: how this can be grasped will be able to be investigated in what follows, but for now it ought to be presupposed as certain and indubitable, so that we may rightly understand the divine simplicity according to the requirement of the divine conditions.
It is also necessary to see the diverse modes of our considerations.
For since three things necessarily concur for consideration, namely the one understanding, the things understood, and the medium or ground of understanding, some mode can be attributed to our intellect in a threefold way: either such that it posits that mode concerning the thing, and then it is true if it is found in that thing, as when it spiritually understands spiritual things; or such that it posits that mode concerning itself, as when it abstractly understands conjoined things, and yet it is not false, because, as the Philosopher says, "there is no falsehood in those who abstract"; or it posits it concerning the ground through which it understands, as when it understands one thing in a manifold way through many things.
It should be known therefore that our intellect completely resolves every understanding of a thing into an understanding of its whereby it is and what it is, and when it understands a composite thing, then it posits that resolution concerning itself and concerning the thing: but when it understands a thing that is altogether simple, then it posits that resolution not concerning the thing, but concerning itself, because it cannot understand otherwise. Whence our intellect, when it understands God, entirely understands that in him there is all simplicity and no composition, no concretion, yet it understands by way of the whereby it is and the what it is; nor however is it false, because it does not posit that mode concerning the thing, nor vain, because truly something corresponds on the part of God, although not something diverse. For truly there is in God essence and supposit, but yet they are one; truly will and power, yet they are not many things, but are known through many things.
And hence it is that "it is more truly than it is understood, and it is more truly understood than it is spoken," as Augustine says. For this reason every intellect falls short of understanding the divine being, and yet nonetheless the faithful intellect concerning it understands nothing but one thing, when it understands the one in a multiform manner, the abstract concretely, the simple in a complex way, the immense finitely, the eternal temporally, because, as has been said, it does not attribute these modes to the intelligible object itself, but to itself as understanding or to the manner of understanding. Therefore the true intellect confesses by the proper light of reason that the divine being is altogether most simple.
Hence the arguments that show this are to be granted.
1. To that which is first objected to the contrary, that the divine being differs supremely from created being: it must be said that this is true; but as to what is further inferred—therefore it differs by many differences—it can be said that this does not follow, because the highest genera differ supremely, and yet they differ by themselves. The differences also that immediately divide a genus itself differ by themselves, and yet they are maximally distant from one another.
And if you object that the more things agree in many respects, the more similar they are—therefore the more things differ in many respects, the more different they are—it can be said that the divine being differs from created being by many differences, which indeed posit plurality and real difference on the part of the creature, but not on the part of God, because those things which exist in the creature through multiformity and real difference are found much more perfectly in God through most simple identity, as is clear from what has already been said and will be said below.
2. To that which is objected, that being entirely abstract from a supposit is simpler than concrete being: it must be said that the supposit is twofold: one which adds something beyond the nature, and another which does not add. Concerning the first supposit, which adds something beyond the nature, contracting and distinguishing it, this holds true; but in this way we do not posit a supposit in the divine things, because there is no distinction there through any addition made to the nature, but through the origin of one person from another; whence there is no concretion there according to real inherence, but only according to our understanding.
And if one objects that either something corresponds to that understanding on the part of the thing, or nothing: the response is already clear, that something does correspond. For there is in the divine things truly a nature and truly a supposit, that is, deity and one having deity; whence although the intellect understands this by way of a certain difference, it is not however false, because it posits that mode concerning itself or concerning the manner of understanding, but not concerning the thing which it understands; or if it is posited, some real difference is posited between the supposit and the nature, and such a difference is one that introduces no composition, as will be more clearly shown in the following question.
3. To that which is objected, that whatever nobility is in a creature must be attributed to the Creator: it must be said that there is nobility simpliciter, and there is nobility secundum quid. That, however, which in a creature denotes nobility simpliciter, must properly and truly be attributed to the creative essence; but that which denotes nobility with diminution, it is not fitting to attribute to God. When therefore it is said that greater composition in a creature contributes to the perfection of nobility, as is evident in man: it must be said that this is a diminished nobility, which comes from the aggregation of many things, because what cannot have in itself through one thing it has through many: and therefore such nobility is not to be attributed to the divine esse, which indeed is the most noble at the pinnacle of perfect nobility.
4. To that which is objected, that in ordered forms, the form which has itself by addition is more actual: it must be said that there is actuality in a genus, and there is actuality outside a genus. Actuality, however, in a genus is actuality mixed with potency, which potency indeed is preserved in the nature of the genus and is reduced to act through the superaddition of a distinguishing and specifying difference: and concerning this actuality the aforesaid proposition holds true. — There is also, besides this, actuality outside a genus, which has nothing admixed of potency, and such is pure act; and therefore one need not posit therein one thing added to another, as act is added to pre-existing potency: and such actuality is posited in God: and therefore it does not follow that any addition or composition is posited.
To that which is objected, that the highest good has itself by addition to good: it must be said that it has itself by addition on the part of the intellect, because in the concept of the highest good the concept of good is included: but it does not have itself by addition on the part of the thing: both because created and uncreated good do not share in any common nature; and also because the highest good is of greater simplicity than the common notion itself which is signified by the name good: and also because the highest good exceeds every created good by a disproportionate excess. Whence when good is said of created and uncreated good, this is only by a certain analogy, because all created goodness flows from uncreated goodness as from a first cause: whence the former is posterior and thereby falls short of supreme simplicity; but the latter, as first, by the very fact that it is first, is most simple. Whence, just as the condition of simplicity added upon being, as when I say simple being, does not posit any composition in it: so neither does supremacy in good.
5. To that which is objected, that the properties of the divine esse are unity, truth, goodness: it must be said that truth is called a property of the divine esse because, as far as it is of itself, it denotes a mode of being; but because in the divine esse there is no difference between esse and posse, therefore there is no difference between esse and being thus, because it cannot be thus and otherwise. And on this account, because there esse and the mode of being are the same, therefore there is no composition there; but because the mode of being is a property of the being itself, and not conversely: hence it is that unity, truth and goodness are said to be properties of the divine essence; but essence cannot be called a property of truth or goodness conversely, because it does not name a mode of being, as those do.
6. To that which is objected, that either truth and goodness in God are the same or not: it must be said that, as far as concerns the principal signified or the thing understood through these names, they say the same thing concerning the divine esse, because God is not good by one thing and true by another, but is good by the very same thing by which He is true. But as far as concerns the manner of understanding, according to which the intellect ascends from creatures to the understanding of the Creator: thus there is a difference; because, since uncreated truth and goodness are understood through created truth and goodness, and these in creatures have some manner of difference: therefore these are said to be distinguished in some manner on the part of the manners of understanding, although they are the same on the part of the thing; nor however is there falsity or error in understanding, because these are truly and most perfectly in God, although they are not really diversified among themselves, as in created esse. And this is sufficiently clear, if that which was said at the beginning of the solution about the manifold mode of our consideration is understood.
7. To that which is objected, that acts are diversified through their objects: the response is already clear; because, even though they are the same according to the thing in God, they are nevertheless said to be diversified according to the manner of understanding on our part. Whence, just as to them there corresponds one and another representative property in the vestige of the representing creature, because goodness and truth are not the same in created nature: so there corresponds to it one and another power in the apprehending image, in the intellective and the affective, because both in the vestige and in the image there are certain things through diversity, corresponding nevertheless to certain things in God which have complete identity according to the thing.
8. To the other objection, that either power and wisdom and will say more than any one of these, or nothing: it must be said that explicitly they say something more, but implicitly one of them is enclosed in the other: for there cannot be supreme power where there is not will and wisdom: and therefore, if one is attributed to God without the other, it is attributed diminishedly; not because they are really different, but because by the very fact that they are posited per impossibile to be separated, they are also posited per impossibile to be diversified; and therefore just as they cannot be diversified, so they cannot be separated.
9. To the objection that either power is knowledge, or it is not: it must be said that one can speak of power and knowledge in two ways: either according to the principal signification, or according to the connotation. They are therefore the same according to reality and principal signification, but they differ according to connotation; for it is not the same for something to be knowable and possible to God, just as it is not the same to be known and to be made. Possible designates a thing as it stands in the character of an emanating or emanable thing; knowable, however, as it stands in the character of something present to the intellect of the knower: and since in God there is not one thing by which He is powerful and another by which He is knowing, because both belong to Him by His very self: therefore, although these are diversified in connotation, they are nevertheless the same according to reality.
10. To the objection that will is restrictive of power: it must be said that one can speak of power and will in three ways: either with respect to affect, or with respect to effect, or with respect to relation. In the first way they have identity and equality, because whatever God wills He can will, and whatever He can He wills to be able. In the last way they have inequality, because power is said with respect to possibles, and will with respect to things willed, and there are more possibles than things willed. In the middle way, however, they have equality, namely with respect to effect, because, although power extends to more things than will, nevertheless because God does nothing except what He wills, will and power are said to be equal with respect to effect: and therefore will is said to be restrictive of power, not by reason of that which they are, but by reason of that to which they are compared.
11. To the objection that nothing altogether simple is participated according to more and less: it must be said that something is said to be participated in two ways, namely according to form, as a genus is participated by its species; or according to influence, as a cause is participated by its effects. In the first way the proposition is true: but in this way the divine being is not said to be participated according to more and less, but only in the second way; and this does not posit diversity in the thing participated itself, but in that through which that participation occurs, namely in some created gift.
12. To that which is objected, that nothing altogether simple has multiform operation: it must be said that operation is spoken of both as the work operating and the work operated, or as the active act and the produced effect. In the first way, therefore, the operation of God is the same as God himself, and therefore is not multiplied by reason of itself in itself, but by reason of the produced effect on the part of the creature. In the first way, therefore, the proposition has truth, but in the second it does not: because the simpler something is, the more powerful it is, and through this the more it is the principle of multiform effects.
13. To that which is objected, that nothing altogether simple turns itself simultaneously to disparate and infinite operations: it must be said that something happens to be simple in a twofold way: in one way, in which simplicity excludes immensity; in another way, in which it includes it. Concerning the first, the aforesaid proposition has truth, but concerning the second, not at all, because the infinite, inasmuch as the divine infinite being is most infinitely infinite, can simultaneously turn itself to all things however great and of whatever quality without constraint, since it admits absolutely no limitation.
14. To that which is lastly objected, that nothing altogether simple is multiform in species or in assimilation: it must be said that there is multiformity according to the notion of informing and according to the notion of expressing. In the first way, multiformity belongs to that which has within itself the natures of diverse forms: and thus it cannot stand with supreme simplicity. In the second way, multiformity belongs to that which has in itself the ideas of many forms, and in this way it stands with supreme simplicity. For just as the most simple, by its supreme actuality, has supreme power, by which it can produce all things distinctly and fully: so also supreme truth, by which it can eternally represent all things, as was more fully shown above in the question concerning the eternal reasons.
ARTICLE II.
Whether trinity and supreme simplicity can stand together simultaneously.
Next it is asked concerning this, whether trinity and supreme simplicity can stand together simultaneously. And that they are incompossible is shown by several arguments.
1. An abstract being is simpler than a concrete one: therefore a nature having no supposit is simpler than a nature existing in several hypostases; but trinity posits the existence of a nature in several hypostases: therefore it diminishes from supreme simplicity.
2. Likewise, the same is simpler than the diverse: therefore everything in which there is complete identity is simpler than that in which any diversity however slight is found: but there cannot be trinity without some diversity however slight: therefore it cannot stand with supreme simplicity.
3. Likewise, the common is simpler than the proper, as is evident, because the proper implies in itself the common and something more: but there cannot be a true trinity without the distinct and incommunicable properties of the three persons: therefore it is impossible to posit a trinity without positing in it some departure from supreme simplicity.
4. Again, every absolute is simpler than the relative, because, as Augustine says, "every relative is something, apart from that which is said relatively"; whence the relative includes the absolute; but there cannot be a trinity of persons without a plurality of relations: therefore etc.
5. Again, every defining element is simpler than the defined; but nature falls within the definition of person: therefore nature is always simpler than person: therefore the notion of personality cannot stand together with supreme simplicity. But trinity cannot exist except in persons: therefore trinity is repugnant to supreme simplicity.
6. Again, a part is always simpler than the whole: but unity is a part of trinity, and one person is a part of three persons: therefore if trinity posits true plurality, and true plurality posits true totality, and true totality excludes supreme simplicity: therefore from the first, trinity cannot stand together with supreme simplicity.
7. Again, a point is always simpler than a continuum, therefore also unity than number: therefore the unity of person is simpler than the trinity of persons: but that which has something simpler than itself is not supremely simple: therefore it is impossible for trinity to be compatible with supreme simplicity.
8. Again, either a person is equally simple as the essence, or not. If not: therefore either person does not exist in the divine, or the divine being is not the most simple; but if equally simple as the essence; but the essence, on account of supreme simplicity, does not admit of multiple divine essences: therefore by equal reasoning neither does person.
9. Again, either person adds something above nature according to being and understanding, or according to understanding alone, or according to neither. If in the first way: therefore it is incompatible with supreme simplicity; if in the second way: therefore the understanding is vain and false, to which nothing corresponds in reality; if in the third way: therefore just as nature is not multiplied, so neither is person.
10. Again, either whatever belongs to the person belongs to the nature, and conversely, or not. If so: therefore since person is distinguished, nature too would be distinguished, and thus there will not be supreme simplicity there; if not: but affirmation and negation are not true of the same thing and according to the same: therefore according to one thing and another; but that which has this is composite: therefore etc.
11. Again, either one person wholly differs from another, or wholly agrees, or partly agrees and partly differs. If it wholly agrees: therefore it has nothing proper to itself, therefore it is not distinguished: but if it wholly differs: therefore if one is God, the other is not God: if it partly agrees and partly differs: since this is not according to the same, it will be composite.
12. Again, when one person communicates to another, either it communicates to it whatever it has, or not. If not: therefore it gives something of itself and retains something, therefore it is composite and avaricious. If whatever it has: therefore just as it communicates to it its quiddity, so also its personality.
If you say that personhood is not communicable: to the contrary: because it is just as simple as the nature, as you say: therefore just as the nature is communicable, so it seems that the person is also.
13. Furthermore, the property of a person is either something or nothing. If nothing: then it does nothing, and therefore does not distinguish that in which it is. If something, it either is in the essence or not. If it is in the essence: but a property distinguishes that in which it is: therefore the nature and essence are numerically multiplied: which is against the Trinity. If it is not in the essence, but in the person: then something according to reality is in the person that is not in the essence: therefore it is necessary that the property make the person composite.
14. Furthermore, the property of a person is a relation: therefore either it passes over into the substance, as do the other categories, or it does not pass over. If it passes over: then just as the substance is not distinguished nor distinguishes, so neither does the property: therefore there is no Trinity. If it does not pass over: then it signifies something beyond the substance, and therefore detracts from the character of simplicity: if therefore it cannot exist without properties, then it is impossible that it stand together with supreme simplicity.
15. Furthermore, a point, just as it is not composed by its relations, so neither is it really multiplied numerically: if therefore God is simpler than a point, then in no way is there in Him any real distinction.
16. Furthermore, the absolute is prior to the relative: therefore a distinction according to an absolute property is prior to that which is according to a relative one: but the more prior something is, the simpler it is: if therefore a distinction according to absolute properties does not stand together with supreme simplicity, then neither does a distinction according to relative properties.
To the contrary: 1. It happens that we find something simple because it is one in one, and something more simple because it is one in many though multiplied—which is simpler because it is one in many, like a universal, but nevertheless not supremely so, because it is numerically multiplied: therefore if something were one in many and not multiplied, that would be the simplest of all: but this must be attributed to the divine being, which is the simplest of all: therefore the Trinity does not take away the simplicity of the divine essence.
2. Furthermore, a plurality of natures does not conflict with the simplicity of a person, as is evident in Christ: therefore if a diversity of natures contributes more to composition than a plurality of persons, it seems that much more strongly a plurality of persons in no way diminishes the simplicity of the nature: therefore it stands, etc.
3. Furthermore, God can create without any diminishment of His simplicity: therefore if to generate and to spirate is an intrinsic act, much more strongly does He generate and spirate while supreme simplicity remains. But because He generates and spirates, there is a Trinity: therefore, etc.
4. Furthermore, to understand is an act that in no way conflicts with simplicity, but rather attests to and accords with it: but any mind, by understanding itself, generates a likeness of itself, which is called a word distinct from the one generating it: therefore, just as the act of understanding can stand together with supreme simplicity, so also can generation, and by equal reasoning the production of the Holy Spirit: therefore it seems that the entire Trinity stands together with supreme simplicity.
5. Furthermore, as Augustine says in the sixth book of On the Trinity, "in spiritual things the greater and the better are the same"; but in the blessed Trinity each person is supremely good: therefore the three are not something better than one, and therefore neither something greater. But in every composition something added is posited, which is in some way more: therefore that supreme Trinity posits no composition whatsoever: therefore it in no way conflicts with simplicity.
6. Furthermore, supreme simplicity does not exclude but includes supreme perfection; supreme perfection does not exclude but includes plurality: therefore from the first, supreme simplicity does not exclude but includes a plurality of persons: therefore it does not conflict, but most greatly accords.
7. Furthermore, supreme simplicity does not exclude but includes supreme power and virtue, because, as was proved above, the more a virtue is united, the more it is infinite: but supreme and most actual virtue posits the supreme and most perfect communication and production, and this posits the Trinity: therefore the Trinity and supreme simplicity necessarily stand together.
8. Furthermore, light is said of spiritual and corporeal substance, and of created and uncreated spiritual substance according to a certain proportion and analogy; but the production of material splendor diminishes nothing of the simplicity of material light, and the production of spiritual light, such as an intelligence or word from the mind, diminishes nothing of the simplicity of intellectual substance: therefore the production of the eternal Splendor from the Father diminishes nothing of the simplicity of the eternal light.
9. Furthermore, the simplicity of a point and of unity and of any created principle does not exclude but includes a plurality of relations and respects, and in this way it is not a matter of imperfection but of perfection: but every such thing is to be attributed to God: therefore regarding God, supreme simplicity and a plurality of relations do not conflict. But "relation multiplies the Trinity," as Boethius says: therefore etc.
10. Furthermore, where there is no matter and position, there can be no separation: therefore a production abstracting from the notion of position and matter posits no separation: therefore it stands with complete indivision, and therefore with complete simplicity. If therefore by such a production the persons in the Trinity are produced, then the Trinity can stand together with supreme simplicity.
CONCLUSION.
The Trinity of persons does not take away supreme simplicity, nor does supreme simplicity exclude the Trinity.
I respond: It must be said that the first principle is at once triune and most simple, such that neither does trinity remove supreme simplicity, nor does supreme simplicity exclude trinity: and this indeed we hold most certainly through faith.
But in order that we may understand to some extent, two things must be noted here beforehand: first, the diverse modes of personal distinctions, second, the diverse modes of divine attributions.
As to the first, it must be understood that, as Richard says in On the Trinity, a person is distinguished from a person in three modes, namely by origin alone, by quality alone, by origin and quality together. The first mode is in the divine persons, the second in angelic spirits, the third in human beings.
For human beings are distinguished from one another by quality on account of the diversity of accidents and properties by which one individual is discerned from another; and by origin, because one human being is born from another.
But angels, because they differ in substances and formal properties, are distinguished by quality: but because one does not proceed from another, they are not distinguished by origin.
But the divine persons, because they are altogether one in substance and form and have no accidents, are not distinguished by quality, but by origin alone: and that origin belongs to the person itself not through something else, but through itself, such that, just as God understands by Himself and is His own intellect, so the Father begets by Himself and is the very generation, and similarly the Son is His own filiation: if therefore there is there a most true origin, there is a most true personal distinction.
Again, if the person is its own origin, there is altogether no composition in the person, and through this the person is just as simple as the essence: there is therefore a complete indifference according to reality between person and essence, and between person and property and essence. Whence truly the person is the essence and the property, and the essence is the property and the person, and the property is the person and the essence. How then can any composition be understood in such great indifference? It is necessary therefore in such a distinction of persons to understand complete simplicity: since therefore it is impossible to understand any composition, the trinity of persons understood and supreme simplicity are not incompatible.
It is therefore very valuable for seeing this to examine the modes of personal distinctions, which heretics, being ignorant of, fell into error.
Again, the diverse modes of divine attributions must be attended to. For there is a difference with respect to modes of being and with respect to modes of relating and with respect to grounds of understanding.
In the divine reality, therefore, with respect to being or essence, no diversity or difference can be found, because that being is one and most simple: nor even with respect to the absolute mode of being ,— because, just as in God being is not something other than essence and existence, so existence and existing in such a way are not different. And the reason for this is that in God power and existence are the same, and it cannot be said that He could exist in this way and otherwise. And therefore, because the modes of being are the same as essence, all predicates expressing an absolute mode pass into substance, with the exception of relation, which expresses a respective mode of being: which mode of predication, in comparison to the subject, passes into substance, so that the hypostasis is its own property, lest composition be introduced; but it remains in comparison to the term, so that true distinction may be preserved. For the difference of a relation from the subject in which it inheres introduces composition: but the difference from the term to which it tends introduces nothing but distinction alone. Since therefore in the divine reality no difference is found, neither with respect to essence nor with respect to existence nor with respect to the absolute modes of being: it is nevertheless found in the three aforesaid ways. For difference with respect to the modes of being exists among the persons mutually: because, although they have the same existence, yet in a different mode, because one is from itself, but another from another; and this is so great a diversity that it does not permit one person to be predicated of another. For those modes, as was shown above, although they do not introduce composition, nevertheless produce true distinction.
But difference with respect to the modes of relating exists in the persons as related to the essence. For since to originate belongs to the person itself, not to the essence, therefore the person is referred and relates to another, but the essence does not: and hence it is that one is distinguished, namely the person, and not the other, namely the essence. And from this difference it does not follow that one is removed from the other, yet it does follow that something can be said of the person that is not said of the essence, and conversely. And from this difference arises a threefold mode of predication in the divine reality, namely in quid and in quis and in quae, namely notion, person, and essence: and hence it is that, when person is supposed, notion is not supposed, nor conversely, and similarly with essence. But from the variation of such modes there is introduced a figure of speech in the divine reality, as is evident to one who considers it.
But difference with respect to the intelligible notions exists among the essential properties, which are entirely the same, as truth and goodness: yet our intellect understands through diverse concepts and under one notion and another, and therefore names them differently: and this is the least difference that can be found concerning divine things, because it is more on our part than on God's.
Supreme simplicity therefore stands not only with personal distinction, but also with multiform attribution. Hence the arguments that are for this position must be granted; to the opposing arguments, however, it is easy enough to respond.
1. To the first objection to the contrary, that an abstract being is simpler than a concrete one: it must be said that this holds true in that in which form and supposit differ, in which indeed there is abstraction and concretion on the part of the thing; but in the divine, concretion is not properly posited except on our part. —Similarly, to what it says, that what is one and not in many is simpler than what is in many: it must be said that this holds true where something is more in many than in one, as is the case in number; but it is not so in the matter at hand, because the divine essence and nature is just as completely and perfectly in one of its hypostases as in three.
2. To the objection that the same is simpler than the diverse, etc.: it must be said that there is a diversity or distinction that comes from addition, such as that which is between diverse species, which are distinguished by diverse differences added upon the genus; and there is a distinction coming not from addition, but from origin:
and this latter is in the divine persons, which are distinguished from the fact that one emanates from another; and this posits no composition, as was explained in the principal solution.
3. To the objection that the common is simpler than the proper: it must be said that this holds true where the common is narrowed and contracted by the proper; for then, by reason of the narrowing and contracting agent, it admits both composition and distinction, as is apparent in the universal and the particular; but in this way the common is not to be found in the divine, because the essence, although it is common in the divine, is nevertheless not contracted nor narrowed nor distinguished in the persons.
4. To the objection that everything absolute is simpler than the relative: it must be said that the relative is twofold: one kind that bespeaks a relation to another diverse according to essence; another kind that bespeaks a relation only to something consubstantial with it. In the first way, the relative includes a certain dependence, and thereby also bespeaks a deficiency from supreme simplicity; in the second way, it bespeaks no dependence nor deficiency from supreme simplicity, especially when the supposit itself is its own property by which it is referred; and in this way relation is posited in the properties of the divine persons, not in the first way, and thus no composition is introduced from this. —And if it be objected that "every relative is something, apart from what is said relatively": it must be said that if this is understood in the first way, it holds true not only on the part of the intelligible notion, but also on the part of the thing; if it is understood in the second way, it holds true on the part of the intelligible notion, because the Father, apart from the notion of relation, implies a hypostasis, which nevertheless is not other than his personal property.
5. To that which is objected, that every defining term is simpler than the thing defined: it must be said that this holds true of a formal definition and one taken in recto, where the defining terms are essential parts constituting the defined thing itself. But it is not so in the matter at hand: both because the divine persons, properly speaking, cannot be defined; and also because nature does not fall in the definition of person in recto; and also because that definition regards rather the intention of the name of person and nature, according as it enters into our understanding, than it regards the thing itself according to its own proper being, which can neither be comprehended nor defined on account of the supreme simplicity and immensity of the divine being.
6. To that which is objected, that a part is always simpler than the whole: it must be said that this is true. But what it assumes, namely that one of the persons is a part of the Trinity, is false, because every whole denotes something greater than its part. But as has often been said, nothing greater exists in three persons than in one, for each of the persons is supremely being and true and good; therefore, although the Trinity in the divine posits a notion of plurality, it does not on that account posit a notion of true totality.
7. To that which is objected, that a point is always simpler than a continuum, and a unit than a number: it must be said that this holds true of a true number, which is an aggregation of diverse units; but such a number does not exist in the Trinity of divine persons, for the reason that there is not there an aggregation of many units, just as there is not of many entities or truths, but rather it is a replication of the same unity in relation to one and another. And this is what the very word conveys which is called "trinity," that is, the unity of three.
8. To that which is objected, that either a person is equally simple as the essence, or not: it must be said that a person is equally simple according to reality.
And to what is further objected, that the essence on account of its supreme simplicity does not admit other essences: it must be said that the case is not similar, because if there were many divine essences, there would be essential agreement and difference: agreement, I say, because each would be God; but difference, because they would be many, and this could not be without addition and composition. But it is not so in the plurality of persons, because, as has been shown, they are not distinguished from one another by any real addition, but only by natural origin; and therefore the simplicity of the essence excludes plurality of essence, and the plurality of persons does not exclude the unity of the divine essence nor does it exclude the simplicity of person.
9. To that which is objected, that either a person adds something over and above the essence according to reality and understanding, etc.: it must be said that according to understanding it adds, because in the true understanding of person there is enclosed the understanding of nature and property and hypostasis. Hence its understanding is composite, yet in such a way that, just as there is no composition, so also there is no addition on the part of reality.
And if it be objected that this understanding is false: it must be said that this is false, because on the part of the thing something corresponds to it; for in the divine there truly are those three, namely nature, property, and hypostasis distinguished by its own property; yet they are altogether one in itself through supreme simplicity, to which, because our intellect cannot attain, it understands and names under a different account and under a certain composition, which it posits not about the thing itself but about itself as understanding, as was held in the preceding problem.
10. To that which is objected, that affirmation and negation are not true of the same thing and according to the same respect: it must be said that not only does it prevent contradiction that some things are said of the same thing not according to the same respect, but also that they are not said in relation to the same thing. And because a person is to be referred and compared to another, but nature is not: hence it is that something can be attributed to one that is not attributed to the other; nor yet does it follow from this that there is in them composition or diversity according to essence or being: for it suffices that it be only according to relation.
11. To that which is objected, that either one person agrees entirely with another, or partly agrees and partly differs: it must be said that a person agrees with another according to essence, but differs according to property. Now that property, compared to the essence, is only a mode of being, which is the same as the essence according to what it is, because the essence is the property itself, but differs according to that to which it is directed. And because composition comes according to that in which something is, but distinction according to that to which it is directed: therefore the difference that is between property and essence is such that it suffices for distinction, yet introduces no composition.
12. To that which is objected, that either one person communicates to another whatever it has, or not: it must be said that it communicates to it whatever it has that is communicable, and this is the essence or nature; but personality, or relation, which is in that person, expresses the account of a distinguishing principle rather than of something communicable. And therefore, although it does not communicate this, the communication there is nonetheless perfect, because with the communication the distinction remains intact.
13. To that which is objected, that the property of a person is either something or nothing: it must be said that the property of a person, formally and properly speaking, is toward something: and that toward something can be compared both to the divine essence and to the person whom it distinguishes, and to the person from whom it distinguishes. By comparison to the person from whom it distinguishes, it is truly a thing, because it really differs from that person, just as the Father is also really distinguished from the Son by paternity; but by comparison to the person in whom it is, or also to the essence itself, it is only a mode, which does not posit any composition in God, because, as was previously shown, being and being thus or the mode of being do not differ in God, just as "living and living blessedly".
14. To that which is objected, that the property of a person either passes into substance or does not: it must be said that relation indicates a twofold respect, namely to the subject in which and to the term to which. In the first way it passes over, just as the other genera do; in the second way it remains. And because relation, beyond the other genera, indicates a comparison as to another, hence it is that all things are said to pass into substance, while relation itself does not pass over—not because it in some way indicates something that is not the essence, but because it belongs to it to be said toward something, to which the essence cannot be said to be related or referred. Whence without doubt the essence is that toward, but it is not that to which that toward is directed; and therefore distinction is preserved there, and no composition.
15. To that which is objected, that a point, on account of its simplicity, is neither composed nor numbered by its relations: it must be said that the case is not similar, because the relations of a point are to what is outside, but the personal relations are to what is within: therefore, although a point can be called a beginning and an end with respect to diverse lines, nevertheless no hypostasis can simultaneously be called Father and Son, because none can be to itself a principle of being begotten.
16. To that which is objected, that the absolute is prior to the relative, and therefore distinction according to an absolute property is prior to that which is according to a relative property: it must be said that this does not hold, because every distinction includes some respect and moreover, that distinction which recedes less from the first and highest unity is indeed prior: but this distinction is that in which unity is not multiplied, and such cannot be essential but only relative. Whence it can be said either that that argument does not conclude, or that that proposition holds true of the relative which imports some dependence. But this genus of the relative is not posited regarding the distinction of the eternal persons: and therefore it does not cause a recession from the nature of the most simple, just as neither from the nature of the first and most absolute, as is clear from what has been established above.