Question 8
QUESTION VIII.
Whether trinity can stand together with supreme primacy.
Lastly it is asked whether trinity can stand together with supreme primacy. And it seems that it cannot:
1. Because primacy in essence excludes every other essence: for it is impossible that there be two first essences, since it would necessarily follow that neither would be first: therefore if primacy in essence excludes a plurality of essences, by equal reasoning primacy in person also excludes a plurality of persons:
therefore it is impossible that being first and being triune are simultaneously compatible with respect to God.
2. Likewise, primacy with respect to causality excludes plurality: for it is necessary that there be one sole first cause.
3. Likewise, as the last being of active production relates, so does the first being of passive production: but the last, precisely because it is last, does not admit active production, such that something of it produces something: therefore neither does the first admit passive production: therefore it is impossible for something to be supremely first and to have produced being: if therefore trinity includes passive production, then it excludes perfect primacy.
4. Likewise, either those three persons are equally first, or they are not equally first. If they are equally first: then one does not produce the other any more than conversely; if they are not equally first: then there is not a supreme character of primacy in all the persons.
5. Likewise, either they are equally principiating, or they are not. If they are equally principiating: then by whatever reason one is the principle of another, by the same reason conversely; if they are not equally principiating: then the character of principle is not equally in them, and consequently neither is the character of primacy.
6. Likewise, unity is prior in reality and in understanding to plurality: therefore supreme primacy belongs only to that in which there is unity without plurality: but trinity includes true plurality: therefore it excludes perfect primacy.
7. Likewise, the more prior something is, the more it holds the character of fontality in producing: therefore from the fact that it is simply first, whatever is produced necessarily flows forth: if therefore no person can flow forth from itself, it is impossible that any person flows forth or is produced and simultaneously stands together with perfect primacy.
But to the contrary: 1. The first and a principle are the same: therefore if from eternity it was first, from eternity it was also a principle: but a principle according to its most complete character exists when it is principiating and producing according to the mode of perfect production: if therefore from eternity there was in God the character of perfect primacy, there was also the truth of intrinsic production. But this is posited through the trinity: therefore etc.
2. Again, the more prior something is, the more powerful and actual it is: therefore the first principle was necessarily most actual and most powerful; but the act of the first principle, insofar as it is a principle, is to principiate: therefore if in the first principle, by the very fact that it is first, there is necessarily posited the character of supreme actuality and power, there will necessarily be posited the truth of eternal production, and thereby also the completion of the perfect Trinity.
3. Again, the equal is altogether prior to the unequal both in reality and in understanding; therefore it is impossible to understand the production of an unequal without first understanding the production of an equal: if therefore the production of a creature is a production into inequality, but production according to equality cannot exist except in the blessed Trinity: therefore the production of every creature necessarily presupposes the eternal Trinity.
4. Again, that which can be understood as being from eternity either in reality or in understanding is prior to that which can be understood as having been from eternity neither in reality nor in understanding; but the production of something from something can be understood to have been from eternity, whereas the production of something from nothing cannot have been eternally: therefore before the production of every creature there must necessarily be pre-understood, according to the notion of perfect primacy, a production of something from something. But this cannot be understood except in the uncreated Trinity: therefore etc.
5. Again, the act of the first principle is primarily to principiate or produce: therefore since the principiating is prior to the principiated, therefore the principiation or production of a principiating principle is prior to the production merely of a principiated thing; therefore if the production of a principle exists only in that Trinity of God, it is necessary that if that principle is first, it is also triune.
6. Again, the first principle, by the very fact that it is first, is most simple and most spiritual: therefore it is necessary that it be an intellect; but every intellect that principiates principiates through a word and an intrinsic gift of love; moreover, everything that principiates through a word and love first conceives a word and spirates love before it produces an exterior effect: therefore it is necessary that if the first principle is productive of the being of extrinsic things, it first produce these. But this twofold production posits that God is triune: therefore it necessarily follows that if the first principle is first, it is also triune.
7. Again, natural and intrinsic principiation is prior to voluntary and extrinsic principiation; but voluntary and extrinsic production belongs to the first principle: therefore natural and intrinsic production necessarily belongs to it, and this is not the case unless a Trinity is posited: therefore etc.
8. Likewise, the perfect is prior to the imperfect both in reality and in understanding, the complete prior to the diminished, the one prior to the many, the simple prior to the composite, the infinite prior to the finite, act prior to potency, the immutable prior to the mutable, the eternal prior to the temporal, the necessary prior to the possible: if therefore every creature that has been produced is imperfect, is deficient from the highest unity, is composite, is finite, is a being in potency, is in some way temporal, is variable, is possible, deficient from the highest actuality and necessity: it is therefore necessary that before the production of a creature there be a production of a most perfect, highest, undivided, most simple, most infinite, eternal, immutable, and necessary reality; but this cannot be through the production of a diverse essence: therefore it is necessary that this be through the production of a person having unity of essence with the producing person and equal in power, in wisdom, in goodness; but this is to posit the most blessed Trinity.
CONCLUSION.
Primacy not only does not exclude trinity, but indeed includes it.
I respond: For the understanding of the aforesaid, it should be noted that primacy not only does not exclude trinity, but indeed includes it to such an extent that the first principle is triune by the very fact by which it is also first: which is manifest as follows.
For the highest primacy in the highest and most exalted principle posits the highest actuality, the highest fontality and the highest fecundity. For the first principle, by the very fact that it is first, is most perfect in producing, most fontal in emanating, most fecund in bringing forth. Since therefore perfect production, emanation, and bringing forth is found only according to two intrinsic modes, namely by the mode of nature and by the mode of will, that is, of word and of love: hence it is that it is necessary that there be posited by reason of the highest perfection, fontality and fecundity a twofold mode of emanating with respect to a twofold hypostasis produced, emanating from the first person as from the first producing principle: and through this it is necessary to posit three persons.
And because the most perfect production is only with respect to equals, the most fontal emanation is only with respect to coeternals, the most fecund bringing forth is only with respect to consubstantials: it is necessary to understand that the first principle includes within itself three coequal, coeternal, and consubstantial hypostases. Therefore primacy posits concerning the first principle a most perfect trinity according to the notion of order, origin, and distinction, of coequality and coeternity and consubstantiality: it also posits the highest unity, simplicity, immensity, eternity, immutability and actuality: it therefore posits the trinity of the first principle together with the essential conditions stated above.
Since therefore the first principle, by the very fact that it is first, is supremely one, and by this very fact is supremely simple and immense, and by this very fact is eternal, immutable, and necessary, as is gathered from the foregoing; and again, by the very fact that it is first, is most perfect in producing, most fontal in emanating, and most fecund in bringing forth—and this with respect to equals, co-eternals, and consubstantials, who are distinct, originating, and ordered—hence it is that the first principle, because it is first, is eternal with the fullness of all noble conditions; wherefore in it, insofar as it is first, there is the terminus of realities and of comprehensions.
And on account of this, Rachel, who signifies the contemplative life, is interpreted as the seen principle, because whoever sees it insofar as it is the first principle has the terminus of his condition and his desire fulfilled; which will not be fulfilled unless the first principle is clearly seen, where it is both triune and supremely one.
And those arguments which are brought forward for this position are to be granted.
1.2. To that which is first objected to the contrary, that primacy with respect to essence excludes plurality: it must be said that the case is not similar, because multiple essences essentially differing cannot have an order to one another except according to the notion of prior and posterior; but multiple persons, because they have one essence and one being, can be ordered to one another in such a way that, although there is in them a relation of origin, there is nevertheless no intervention of posteriority; and therefore this plurality does not remove supreme primacy, because it includes no posteriority, which directly opposes primacy.
And through this the response to the following objection, which is raised concerning causality, is clear: because the order of causes through essential diversity is considered according to the comparison of the posterior to the first, which indeed is not to be found in the origin of the persons.
3. To that which is objected, that active production does not befit the last: it must be said that the case is not similar, because, since the last cannot have a relation that is identical with itself, nor is anything produced that is in all respects equal to it on account of its imperfection, therefore in it there is a necessary repugnance between being last and being productive, because something would stand after it as posterior. But it is otherwise on the part of the principle, because on account of the supreme completeness both in the one producing and in the one produced, active and passive production are not repugnant, with no posteriority intervening through which the completeness of perfect unity would be diminished.
4. To that which is objected, that they are either equally first or not: it must be said that first denotes the privation of an anterior in one way; in another way it denotes the privation of origin. If therefore first is said through the privation of an anterior, then they are equally first, because there is nothing there before and after. But if first is said through the privation of origin, namely because it originates from no one: then the notion of primacy principally resides in the person of the Father, by reason of which there is in him a fontal plenitude for the production of all persons. Whence also, because innascibility includes this property, it is therefore said to be a property which is a notion of the Father; which indeed would not be so unless it simultaneously expressed both nobility and a ground of being made known, and were also said relatively.
5. To that which is objected, that they are either equally principiating or not: it must be said that they are equally principiating essentially, but not equally personally, because the Father is the principle of two, the Son of one, and the Holy Spirit of none. Since therefore the notion of primacy, which belongs essentially to the first principle, is equally in all those three persons, therefore the Trinity stands together with supreme primacy: because, just as not being able to generate in the Son does not posit impotence, so not being from himself but from the Father does not posit any posteriority, and through this does not diminish the notion of perfect primacy.
6. To that which is objected, that unity is prior in reality and in understanding to plurality: it must be said that this is true of that plurality which is from the aggregation of unities; but of that plurality in which the same unity belongs to the three, it does not hold true, because in them there is one truth, one light, one ground of understanding on the part of God himself as understood. But that we understand unity before trinity, this is on account of the deficiency of understanding on our part.
7. To that which is objected, that the more fontal something is, the more prior it is in producing: it must be said that, as has already been touched upon, first, according as it is taken in two ways, both through the privation of essential anteriority and the privation of personal origin, thus includes a twofold fontality, according as it denotes the privation of essential anteriority and the privation of personal origin. According as it denotes the privation of essential anteriority, it thus includes fontality with respect to effects and essences to be produced; and thus, since this condition belongs equally to all persons, the notion of fontality equally belongs to them in the production of the being of creatures, because they are not three but one principle of creation. But according as it denotes the privation of personal origin, thus it belongs to the innascible person alone, namely the Father, in whom is the plenitude of fontality for the production of the Son and the Holy Spirit.
This fountainhead, however, is in a certain way the origin of another totality. For since the Father produces the Son, and through the Son and with the Son produces the Holy Spirit, therefore God the Father, through the Son with the Holy Spirit, is the principle of all created things: for unless He produced them from eternity, He could not produce through them in time: and therefore by reason of that production in the Trinity He is rightly said to be the fountain of life. For just as He has life in Himself, so He gives the Son to have life in Himself etc. Hence it is that eternal life is this alone, that the rational spirit, which flows from the most blessed Trinity and is the image of the Trinity, returns by way of a certain intelligible circle through memory, understanding, and will, through the deiformity of glory into the most blessed Trinity.