Question 3
QUESTION III. Whether God knows things through likenesses that are really distinct.
Supposing that God knows things through exemplar likenesses, it is asked whether through likenesses that are really distinct. And that this is so appears:
1. By authority. Augustine, Eighty-Three Questions, the question on ideas: "If it cannot rightly be said or believed that God made all things irrationally, it remains that all things were made by reason, nor was man made by the same reason as the horse: for this is absurd to suppose: therefore individual things were created by their own proper reasons."
2. Likewise, in the same place: "Ideas are unchangeable forms that are contained in the divine intelligence": but every form is a thing: therefore if there are many forms, there are many things. If therefore the ideas are many, it is necessary that they be really distinct.
3. Likewise, Dionysius, On the Divine Names, chapter five: "We say that exemplars in God are the substance-making reasons of existing things, singularly pre-existing, which theology calls predefinitions"; but of diverse things the substance-making reasons are diverse: therefore since created things are really diverse, it is necessary that those substance-making reasons be really distinct.
4. Likewise, the Philosopher, Metaphysics VII: "Every agent acting according to an exemplar is at the end of its operation the form of the thing produced"; but God is an agent acting according to an exemplar: therefore if the completive forms of things made have a real difference, it is necessary that those exemplar reasons have a real diversity.
5. Likewise, this same thing appears by reason. God is an agent acting from purpose; but an agent acting from purpose does not produce things unless it has them within itself: therefore if it produces a diversity of things, it is necessary that it have them within itself under the aspect of diversity: but it does not have them except through their reasons: therefore it is necessary that the reasons of things be really diversified.
6. Likewise, whatever things have they receive from God: therefore since they have diversity among themselves, they receive it from that most noble art: therefore if they receive it thence, it is necessary that it be found there. But it is not there except in the exemplar reasons: therefore it is necessary that those be really distinct.
7. Likewise, of opposite effects the proximate and immediate and uniformly acting causes are opposite; but the exemplar reasons of things are proximate and immediate and uniformly acting causes: therefore since they are causes of things not only diverse but also opposite, it is necessary that they not only be really distinct, but also be mutually opposed.
8. Likewise, "number, as Boethius says, was the principal exemplar in the mind of the Creator"; and Augustine in the second book of On Free Will says that number and wisdom are the same: and it is established that exemplar number is not found in God except with respect to the exemplar reasons. If therefore number posits true plurality, and in those reasons the nature of number is truly and properly posited: therefore truly and properly a real diversity is posited.
9. Again, to know distinctly contributes to the perfection of knowledge; therefore, the most perfect knowledge knows most distinctly. But God does not know things except in the manner in which he has them within himself; therefore, it is necessary that he have them within himself most distinctly. But he does not have them except through their reasons; therefore, it is necessary that these be most distinct; therefore, there is not only a distinction according to reason there, but also according to reality.
10. Again, God does not know things within himself and outside himself differently, but rather uniformly. But outside himself he knows them under a real distinction; therefore also within himself. But he knows in the manner in which he has them; therefore he has them within himself as really distinct.
11. Again, like is known by like: this is true per se, since Augustine says in the ninth book of On the Trinity: "All knowledge according to species is similar to the thing which is known." Therefore, by opposites, the dissimilar is known by the dissimilar. But dissimilar things are really known; therefore the reasons of knowing are also really dissimilar, and therefore also really different.
12. Again, what is similar to one of two opposites as such is dissimilar to its opposite. Therefore, if the idea of white is similar to white, it is dissimilar to black; by equal reasoning, the idea of black is also dissimilar to white. Therefore, it is necessary that the ideas of white and black be dissimilar to each other, and therefore also really different.
13. Again, an idea is a likeness: therefore either according to the whole, or according to a part. If according to a part: then through it the thing is never totally known. If according to the whole: but whatever things are similar according to the whole to some one thing are dissimilar according to the whole in no respect. Therefore, if there were one likeness of creatures according to reality, it would be impossible for them to be really different. But it is evident that they really differ; therefore, it is necessary that a real difference of exemplar likenesses correspond to them.
14. Again, the exemplar reason is a likeness of the known thing: therefore either a common or a proper likeness. If common: then through it the properties of things are not known. If proper: but proper likenesses are multiplied according to the plurality of things. If, therefore, created things are really diverse, it is necessary that their likenesses also really differ from one another.
15. Again, let A be called the reason by which man was made, and B the reason by which a donkey was made. It is certain that A is not B. If, therefore, those things of which one is not predicated of the other in the divine differ really, and not only according to reason, it seems that those are really diverse. The minor is manifest, because although goodness, wisdom, and power differ in reason, nevertheless they are predicated of one another.
16. Furthermore, A is not a likeness of a donkey, nor is B a likeness of a man: therefore A in some way approaches man more than it approaches a donkey: but this would not be the case unless A in some way agreed more with man than B; but this could not be unless it in some way had a real difference: therefore etc.
17. Furthermore, if those ideal reasons are multiplied by reason, either something corresponds to the reason, or nothing. If nothing: then it is empty: if something: then it is necessary in some way that there be a real difference in those reasons.
18. Furthermore, those reasons either differ by reason of what is connoted, or by reason of themselves. If by reason of what is connoted: then since that is temporal, a temporal thing will be the cause of an eternal thing; if by reason of themselves; but things that are distinguished by themselves differ really: therefore those reasons are really diversified.
19. Furthermore, if they differ by reason of what is connoted: then since the Word connotes the effect more than a reason or idea does — because, as is said in the Eighty-Three Questions, "the Word signifies operative power" — it seems therefore that if this were the cause, there would be said to be many words in the divine: but it is established that this is false: therefore for many reasons to be spoken of, the difference of what is connoted does not suffice.
20. Furthermore, caused things are from the reasons and not conversely: therefore the plurality of reasons is also prior to the plurality of connoted things: therefore if they are multiplied, the difference of what is connoted does not bring this about; it is necessary therefore that they be really distinguished by themselves.
21. Furthermore, the plurality of persons is greater than the plurality of species or reasons: but a real difference of persons is not repugnant to the divine simplicity: therefore neither is a real plurality of ideal reasons. If therefore, as the Saints say, they are many: it seems that it must be acknowledged that they are really different.
But to the contrary: 1. Dionysius, in the fifth chapter of On the Divine Names, speaking of God says thus: "He pre-contains all things in himself according to the one excellence of simplicity, rejecting all duplicity." If therefore God pre-contains things in himself through the reasons of things: and those reasons reject all duplicity: therefore they have no real diversity.
2. Furthermore, in the same place: "The one sun uniformly pre-receives in itself the causes of the many participants; much more strongly must it be granted that in the cause of the sun itself and of all things, the exemplars of all existing things pre-exist according to a supersubstantial union"; but this would not be so if those reasons were really distinct: therefore they have no real diversity.
3. Furthermore, Augustine, in the sixth book of On the Trinity, chapter ten: "The Son is the art of the Almighty, full of all living reasons, and all things in him are one"; but this would not be so if those reasons were really diverse: therefore they are necessarily really indistinct.
4. Likewise, Dionysius shows this same thing in On the Divine Names, chapter five, by the following argument: all lines are originally in the point, and all numbers in unity; and yet from this there is not posited in the point and in unity a real diversity in the creature; therefore neither in the supreme cause.
5. Likewise, there is no terminus except in one; but in any genus of cause it is necessary to posit a terminus; therefore, if God is the exemplar cause, in which is the terminus of all formal causes, it is therefore necessary that He have complete unity in reality.
6. Likewise, what is more perfect must be attributed to God; but it is more perfect to know many things by one than many things by many; therefore, etc.
7. Likewise, divine knowledge is infinite; therefore it is in no way confined or limited; therefore neither is the ground of knowing in God limited in any way. But if for knowing many things there were required many really different ideas, then it would be in some way limited and confined; therefore, if it is impossible to posit this, it is impossible that those ideas be really diverse.
8. Likewise, the ground of knowing in the divine denotes something essential, because it is common to the three persons; but those things which are essential in the divine are in no way multiplied in reality, because if they were really multiplied, there would be in the divine many essences; but this is impossible; therefore it is impossible that those ideas really differ.
9. Likewise, whatever things are really distinguished are distinguished either by origin, or by quality, as Richard says; but those ideas cannot be distinguished by quality, because such a distinction does not occur in the divine; nor by origin, because one does not emanate from another; therefore it is impossible that they be really diverse.
10. Likewise, those eternal ideas are productive of things; therefore either producing only, or producing and produced. If producing and produced: then since the producing and the produced are really distinguished, those ideas would be really distinguished from God, since one cannot posit anything else from which they would be produced; therefore they would not be God Himself, nor would God know things through Himself: which is impossible. If they are producing only: then they hold the character of principle alone; but such a principle is a first principle, and a first principle is nothing but uniquely one; therefore it is impossible that those ideas be really distinguished.
11. Likewise, the exemplar idea denotes that through which a thing is known; but that by which a thing is known is nothing other than form; therefore, if God knew things through exemplar ideas really differing, it would be necessary that the divine being itself be multiform. But this is altogether impossible; therefore so is the first.
12. Likewise, if they are really distinguished: since they are things to be enjoyed, and things to be enjoyed make us blessed, no one would be blessed unless he knew all the exemplar ideas, just as no one is blessed who lacks knowledge of any one of the three persons. But this is false and absurd; therefore so is the first.
13. Likewise, the ideal reason in God does not signify something inhering, but rather something subsisting per se, just as the Word does: therefore if there were many reasons really differing, as many reasons as there are, so many would be substances subsisting per se: therefore there would be as many divine persons, or essences, as there are ideas. But this is false and against the faith: therefore it is erroneous to say that they really differ.
14. Likewise, if they really differ, either as absolute things, or as relations: but not as relations, because no relation is designated by the name of that to which it is referred, especially in a relation of superposition; but the reason of man is called man himself: in God, therefore, the ideal reason is not imposed from a real relation. If, therefore, they are really multiplied, they are multiplied as absolute forms: therefore if this is impossible, it is impossible that those reasons really differ.
15. Likewise, if they are really distinguished as diverse real relations: since in a real relation the relatives are simultaneous by nature, the idea and the ideated would be simultaneous by nature, therefore the Creator and the creature: but this is altogether absurd: therefore it is impossible that those reasons be diversified as diverse real relations: nor as diverse absolute things: this is evident: therefore they have no real diversity.
16. Likewise, every real diversity either makes one thing and another thing, or one person and another person, or one quality and another quality; but in none of these modes is it to be posited concerning those eternal reasons, because there is neither essential diversity nor personal nor accidental: therefore in no way is there a real distinction or difference.
CONCLUSION.
God knows things by Himself as the expressive similitude of all things, such that the ideal reasons are not multiplied in God according to reality, but only according to reason.
I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing, it should be noted that without doubt God knows things, and that He knows by Himself, and that He knows by Himself as by a likeness, and that the likeness by which He knows is not a likeness received from without, nor a likeness through agreement in some third nature, but that likeness is nothing other than expressive truth, as was shown in the preceding question. To say, therefore, that God knows things by Himself as by a likeness is nothing other than to say that God knows things by Himself as by truth, or as by the highest light expressing all other things. And since the divine truth is most powerful for expressing all things totally, just as the divine power is for making all things totally, therefore God knows by Himself as by truth expressing manifold things and totally. Moreover, the divine truth, although it is one, is able to express all things by way of exemplar likeness, because it is entirely beyond genus and restricted to nothing; it is also pure act, while all other things in relation to it are material and potential. Since, therefore, one thing according to form can be likened to many things according to matter, as is evident regarding whiteness in a man and a stone: since it relates indifferently to all things, and all other things are material in relation to it, it as pure act can be the expressive likeness of all things.
In this expression, however, three things are to be understood, namely the truth itself, the expression itself, and the thing itself. The expressing truth is one alone both in reality and in reason; but the things themselves which are expressed have a multiformity either actual or possible; the expression, however, according to what it is, is nothing other than the truth itself, but according to that to which it is directed, it pertains to the side of the things which are expressed. Whence the expression of one thing and of another thing in the divine truth, or from the divine truth, according to what it is, is not one thing and another, but according to that to which it is directed, it is said to be multiplied: because to express a man is not to express a donkey, just as to predestine Peter is not to predestine Paul, nor is creating a man the same as creating an angel, although the divine act is one. Since, therefore, the ideal reasons name the very expressions of the divine truth in respect of things, they are said to be multiplied not according to what they signify, but according to what they connote, not according to what they are, but according to that to which they are directed or to which they are compared. And because they are directed to that not according to a real relation which is in God, since God is not really related to anything extrinsic, but only according to a rational relation of understanding, to which there corresponds a real relation in act or aptitude on the part of things: therefore it must be said that the ideal reasons in God are multiplied not according to reality, but according to reason, which reason indeed is not only on the part of the one understanding, but also on the part of the thing understood.
A likeness of this, however, is not perfectly found in creatures; but if it were understood per impossibile that light were its own illumination and irradiation, we could say that of the same light and luminosity there would be multiple irradiations, because irradiation denotes a diametral or orthogonal direction of the luminosity itself; on account of which the irradiations of diverse illuminated things would be called many, yet in one light and in one luminosity. So too must it be understood in the matter at hand, because the divine truth itself is light, and its expressions with respect to things are, as it were, luminous irradiations, though intrinsic, which determinately lead and direct toward that which is expressed. And this is what Dionysius says in the seventh chapter of On the Divine Names: " The divine intellect does not know beings by declaring them from beings, but from itself and in itself, according to the cause of all things, it pre-possesses and pre-conceives the knowledge, science, and substance of all things, not applying itself to individual things according to an idea; that is, not according to really distinct ideas, but knowing and containing all things according to the one excellence of the cause, just as light also, according to the cause, has pre-received in itself the knowledge of darkness, knowing darkness from no other source than from the defect of light. Therefore the divine wisdom, knowing itself, knows all material things immaterially, and indivisibly the divisible, and singularly the many, knowing and producing all things by that very one ". In this passage Dionysius manifestly shows that in the principle of knowing no real plurality falls, because this would derogate from the perfection of divine knowledge; and he shows this same thing more perfectly in the fifth chapter, as was cited above. And therefore the arguments that were made for this side are to be conceded.
1. To the first objection to the contrary, therefore, from Augustine, that man was created by one idea and a horse by another, etc.: it must be said that the otherness there does not denote a real difference, but only one according to reason.
2. To the objection that an idea is a form and a thing, etc.: it must be said that 'idea' both denotes a thing and denotes a mode of a thing — for it denotes a form compared to that which is expressed — nor is it multiplied insofar as it denotes a thing, but insofar as it denotes a mode of a thing: and therefore, when it proceeds from a plurality of ideas to a plurality of things in the divine, it proceeds from a plurality of mode to a plurality of thing: and therefore it errs according to accident, or according to the figure of speech.
3. To the objection that according to Dionysius ideas are substance-making reasons: it must be said that they are called substance-making either because they subsist in themselves, or because they produce the substances of things, or because they express the substances of things — not because they are the substances or essences of the things themselves. Although the essences of the things themselves are multiplied in things, because they are intrinsic to the things themselves, this is nevertheless not necessary for those exemplar reasons, because they do not enter into the constitution of things.
4. To that which is objected, that an agent acting according to an exemplar is the form of the thing produced: it must be said that this is understood of an agent acting according to an exemplar that is directed and regulated by the exemplar itself, as is the case with a created agent; nor even of such an agent is it understood properly that it is in truth the form of the thing produced, but rather that it has something within itself which bears a likeness of the thing to be produced, just as a physician in healing first has health in his mind and art before he afterwards brings it about in practice; and thus the argument introduced fails on both counts.
5. To that which is objected, that an agent acting from purpose does not produce things unless it has them within itself: it must be said that it is not necessary that it have them in their truth, but through likeness, which likeness indeed need not be conformed in all respects to those things of which it is the likeness; as is evident, because of material things the idea or ratio is immaterial, of corruptible things it is incorruptible, and consequently of many things it can be uniform and of different things undivided: and therefore it does not follow that if plurality is represented by the exemplary ideas themselves, that they themselves are really many; just as it does not follow that the ideas of material things are material.
6. To that which is objected, that whatever things have they receive from God: it must be said that they receive from him as from one who can make something from nothing, not because they receive something that belongs to his substance; and therefore it does not follow that if a creature has something in its own genus, that on this account it is necessary to find that same thing in the giver in act; but it suffices that it be found only according to efficient power or representative exemplarity.
7. To that which is objected, that of opposite effects the proximate and immediate causes are opposite, etc.: it must be said that this holds true in constricted causes, which do not produce many things except through many, and therefore do not produce opposites except through opposites; but not in the cause of causes, which has no constriction or limitation, but complete freedom with respect to the production of effects, however different they may be.
8. To that which is objected, that number was the supreme exemplar in the mind of the Creator: it must be said that this is said not because number properly exists in God, since number consists in the aggregation of diverse units, but because God himself knows the number according to which all the proportions of things to be created are determined.
Or if it is said anywhere that in God there is a number of ideas, that departs from the notion of number properly so called, just as also the number of persons, which is not through the multiplication of units, but through the replication of the same unity with respect to diverse hypostases; so also the number of ideas or reasons does not signify a multiplication of eternal units, since that unity is only one, but the relation of that unity itself to the many things to be expressed.
9. To the objection that to know distinctly contributes to the perfection of knowledge, etc., it must be said that the act of knowing regards the knower himself and the thing known: whence to know distinctly can be taken in two ways: either on the part of the knower, or on the part of the thing known. Although to know distinctly on the part of the thing known contributes to the perfection of knowledge, it does not however on the part of the knower, because it is more perfect to know many things by one means than by many.
Alternatively it can be said that to know distinctly is twofold: either such that it denotes distinction according to essential diversity, or such that it denotes exemplary or cognitive expression. In the first way it contributes to the perfection of knowledge on the part of the thing known; in the second way on the part of the knower; and in this way God knows most distinctly, because the eternal truth, although one, nevertheless most distinctly expresses various things, no distinction being found in itself on this account.
10. To the objection that God knows things within and without uniformly, etc., it must be said that if it is understood in the sense that He does not have knowledge of things from without, but only from within, then the foregoing statement is true. But if it is understood in the sense that He knows things to be in the same way within and without, it is false: because within Himself He has them under complete real indifference, and He knows that He has them thus; but without He knows them to have being under manifold difference.
11. To the objection that like is known by like, it must be said that that inference holds for a restricted likeness, which is in a genus; and therefore it has no place in the matter at hand.
Or it must be said that this is not a likeness according to agreement, but only according to exemplative expression; and this likeness or unlikeness does not posit a difference of notion to notion, or of likeness to likeness, but according to that which it connotes and expresses outside itself.
12. To the objection that what is like to one opposite is unlike to its opposite, it must be said that this holds for a likeness which is through participation in a common nature, or through a limited expression, such as that which is received from a thing outside.
13. To the objection that that likeness is either according to the whole or according to a part, it must be said that it is according to the whole, because it is called a likeness insofar as it is expressive and expresses the whole.
And if one objects that no diverse things can be assimilated to the same thing according to the whole, it must be said that this is true of that likeness which is through communication, not through expression. - And if one asks how this can be understood, it must be said, as was stated above, that this is because that likeness is beyond genus and is pure act, and all other things are material in relation to it.
14. To the objection that it is either a common likeness or a proper one: it must be said that whatever belongs to completeness in a creature must be attributed to God; and therefore it is in a certain way common, because it expresses all things commonly, and in a certain way proper, because it expresses each thing perfectly and integrally.
15. To the objection that A is not B: it must be said that in divine things, for one to be truly denied of the other, there need not be a real distinction according to what they are, but according to what they connote: as is clear from the fact that predestination is not reprobation, and this is because, although the significatum of both is the same, namely the divine essence or will, the connotatum is nevertheless one thing and another, namely glory and punishment.
16. To the objection that the likeness of a man is not the likeness of a donkey, etc.: the response is clear: for this is not by reason of the divine truth, which relates equally to expressing man and donkey, but by reason of the connotatum; just as we say that to create a man is not to create an angel.
17. To the objection that if there is a plurality according to reason, either something in reality corresponds to it, or nothing: it must be said that something corresponds to it.
But if it is asked what that something is: I say that on the part of divine truth there corresponds only one thing, which nevertheless is more powerful in representing many things than any created multiformity, because, although that truth is simple, it is nevertheless infinite. On the part of the connotata, however, there corresponds a plurality either actual or potential. For many possibles are many things actually known, even though they do not actually exist in their proper nature.
18. To the objection that if they differ by reason of the connotatum, then something temporal is the cause of something eternal: it must be said that one can speak of the connotatum in two ways: either with respect to its proper being, or insofar as it is connoted. With respect to its proper being, it is true that it is temporal; nevertheless it is eternally connoted, because what is temporal in its proper being is eternally known by God.
19. To the objection that the Word ought similarly to be multiplied if the ratio is multiplied by reason of the connotatum: it must be said that the case is not similar, because the Word signifies the divine operative or expressive power itself, which according to reality and the manner of understanding pertains more to the side of God. But the idea or ratio signifies an expression or likeness which, although according to reality it pertains more to the side of God who knows, nevertheless according to the manner of understanding pertains more to the side of the thing known: and therefore, although they have unity in reality, such that many ideas can be called one truth and one Word, they nevertheless cannot have unity in reason, such that many ideas or rationes can be called one idea or one ratio.
20. To the objection that things are caused by the divine reasons, and therefore the plurality as well, etc., it must be said that the plurality of things in their proper genus is from the plurality of reasons: but the plurality of reasons is nothing other than the things themselves, as they exist in their cause. Whence, although the plurality of ideas or reasons in some way has a corresponding plurality of things, it is nevertheless not caused by it, because God does not know many things, nor does the divine truth express many things, because many things are going to exist; but rather conversely, because He knows many things, therefore many things come to be, as Augustine says in the eleventh book of the City of God: "This world could not be known to us unless it existed; but to God, unless it were known, it could not exist."
21. To the objection that the plurality of persons is greater than the plurality of species, it must be said that the cases are not alike, because the plurality of persons is on account of origin and on account of the mutual and intrinsic relation of person to person; but one idea or reason does not originate from another, nor do they have a mutual or intrinsic relation, nor can they have a real relation to anything outside, because to have a relation to something extrinsic in some way implies dependence and does not permit that in which it is posited to be supremely simple and absolute. And therefore a real plurality of ideas in no way befits the divine being, which is most simple and most absolute. If therefore a plurality is posited there, it must be posited according to the manner of understanding, as was said before, and as the ancient doctors commonly held. — And through this the solution to the objections is clear.